

## **Ethnography of Development Sociology**

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**Abstract:** *Development sociology as a distinct area of study gained prominence in the post-world war era with the evolving interest in political and economic progression of the post-colonial world. The emerging discipline from the mainstream sociology have been particularly interested in development paths and strategies adopted in nations in the various regions of the world with greater emphasis in development trends among the third world nations. This paper chronicled strides in the sub discipline since inception and contributions by scholars towards the growth of the discipline as well as development descriptions, explanation and predictions with the relationship of the western rich nations and third world nations in mind. This paper, hold that the postulations of development sociology as regards global development trends, citizen's capacity building and citizen's freedom/access be encouraged by all stakeholders; as well as consciously addressing the issue of income inequality which currently is criminally wide.*

**Keywords:** *Development, Inequality, Third World, Strategies, Trends.*

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### **Introduction**

The contemporary global challenges besetting development experts are increasing thus, yearning for timely mitigations. The major aim and focus of development studies relates to the examination of the imbalances that stem from the socio-economic and political relationship between the wealthy 'West' or 'North' (First World) and nations of the 'South' (Third World), (Odia, 2015). Higgins 1990 defined development in "simplest terms as a process of economic, social, and technological change by which human welfare is improved. Thus development is 'good' by definition." By this definition, development is a process, and not a state or stage. By analogy, socialism would at best also still be a process. So it was for Marx and Lenin. For them socialism was not an already existing happy state, as Stalin re-defined it. Has someone also re-defined development as a process in the same way? Moreover, to Higgins' economic, social and technological development; we should then add political, cultural, and perhaps spiritual and other dimensions of development. Presumably this would have his agreement, since he suggests about the same in his own discussion of anti-development. As Higgins argues therefore, the increase in some of these dimensions at the expense of others does not necessarily spell a process of development. Furthermore by this definition, no country, nation state, economy, or people would be developed. The industrial(ly) "developed" countries of the West would at best be developing, if they are not underdeveloping. The same would then be true for the countries, regions or peoples in the Socialist East and the Third World South. In many of the latter, however, the process (to coin a phrase) of development of underdevelopment is proceeding apace and even accelerating. Of course, this is also a process, as I always insisted (Frank, 1991).

Today, we can identify at least three major approaches in the sociological study of development. Much of contemporary sociology focuses on institutions as the driving force (or barrier) to democratization, economic growth, or social welfare provisions, taking on a comparative vantage point. This "new comparative institutionalism" (Evans and Stephens, 1988) was formulated both as a critique and a recombination of elements from modernization, and dependency and world-system approaches. This approach stresses the critical role of class relations and the state as an autonomous actor in understanding development processes. More recently, sociologists have become increasingly interested in how

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processes of "globalization" impact the development trajectories of nation-states, regions, and cities. Globalization perspectives highlight the importance of global flows of material and symbolic goods and the mediation of these flows through both local and national structure. Further, a "social capital" approach has gained prominence within sociology emphasizing the explanatory power of social network configurations and the resources engrained in them for the explanation of development outcomes (Woolcock, 1998). At the same time, the concept of development itself has been scrutinized in recent debates. Sociologists discuss the institutional and societal implications of the "capability approach" (Sen, 1999), in which development is thought about as the expansion of individuals' capacity to pursue choices they have reason to value rather than remaining exclusively associated with growth and technological change. In this sense, while entailing a diverse set of more specific policy implications, these major sociological approaches and discussions share a rally cry for policies that focus on the social and cultural dimension of wellbeing and empowerment beyond individualistic and utilitarian principles (Rao and Walton, 2004).

This paper examines the ethnography of development sociology, its evolutions and intellectual contributions of development scholars.

### **The Sociological Classics and Development**

As a legacy, the classical works of this period still enjoy a prominent status in the sociological study of development. Marx's analytical framework stressed that alliance and conflict among different classes are crucial for explaining variation in economic progress. In a similar vein, Marx conceived conflicting classes and their mobilization as influencing social and political outcomes such as the transition to democracy or the implementation of welfare policies (Marx, 1963; Marx, 1964; Marx, 1967). Weber emphasized a combination of historical and socio-structural features to explain why the transition towards capitalism first took place in Western Europe. In Weber's view, the conjuncture of the emergence of a central state and the rise of urban burgher classes weakened the feudal order and allowed new ideas and belief systems such as the Protestant "spirit of capitalism" to flourish and transform the economic order (Weber, 1952; Weber, 1978). Durkheim portrayed societies as integrated systems with functionally compatible roles and institutions. Based on an evolutionary approach he argued that societies progress from undifferentiated to more complex types with an extensive division of labor fulfilling all necessary social functions in a more effective manner. For Durkheim, this transition can best be explained by demographic change and technological innovations in the domain of transportation and communication (Durkheim, 1984). These three classical works of sociology shared as a consideration the belief that the economic, social, and political development processes taking place in Europe was highly problematic and therefore worth theorizing about their origins and consequences (Rao and Walton, 2004).

### **Evolution**

Dependence 'theory' prospered, despite early and continued rejection, resistance, and attacks. This 'alternative' approach found little favor with the orthodox right, some of the structuralist reformist left, the Soviet aligned Communists, Trotskyists, and soon also the Maoists. Nonetheless, dependence was 'consumed' in Latin America and elsewhere. In Latin America, dependence was enshrined at the Latin American Congress of Sociology in Mexico in 1969 under the presidency of Pablo Gonzalez Casanova. At the congress of Latin American economists in Maracaibo, Venezuela, resistance was much fiercer. Dependence theory and writing also made a notable impact on and through the 'theology of liberation,' which was and still is spread through Catholic Church groups in Latin America. A reviewer would comment thus: Andre Gunder Frank's trilogy does no less than attempt to historically trace and analyze this global crisis in the context of a long-term structural crisis of capital accumulation. Frank was a lone Marxist voice, anticipating the dangers and potentialities of the deep-rooted crisis which now, many years later, engulfs the capitalist, socialist and Third World regions of the world. In this trilogy, Frank expands his original insight into a comprehensive, complex, scientific, and passionate treatise (Shank, 1982).

The recession that began in 1989 in the United States was the longest lasting and in many respects the most serious of the present world economic crisis. After 1967, each subsequent recession in 1969-70, 1973-74, and 1979-82 had in turn been worse than the one before. The author argued this was because the underlying structural crisis problems had not been resolved, but that inappropriate policies had instead aggravated them and paved the way for the next recession. The recourse by policy makers to anti-recessive economic policies to promote and sustain recovery rendered these instruments less available when they are needed to combat the next recession. Examples in domestic monetary policy included the accommodation of monetary policy and lower interest rates by the Federal Reserve. Examples in domestic fiscal policy included increased public (defense) expenditures, reduced taxes, and a bigger budget deficit. Examples in international economic policy are exchange rate intervention and trade policy. Therefore easy recourse to these and similar economic policies to assure a soft landing in, let alone provide for a sustained recovery from, the next recession are likely to be, and have since 1989 indeed been less available, effective and adequate. In particular, the recourse to reflation, which is so dear to some economists and to policy-makers hearts, was not likely to be an adequate policy remedy in the next recession (see Chew and Denmark, 1996).

All of these economic possibilities and policy options would sharpen already existing economic and political conflicts of interest (and of economic and monetary policy as other paragraphs explained) among the United States and its Japanese and European allies as well as with Third World countries. The United States, Japan and Western Europe could turn increasingly toward neo-mercantilism and/or the formation of regional blocs. These blocs might be centered on the United States in the Americas, Japan in Asia, and Germany in Western Europe and perhaps Eastern Europe. These could also promote the creation or extension of a European bloc in Western Europe or in all of Europe, including Eastern Europe. This policy to extend detente into a pan-European entente was also proposed in my *The European Challenge: From Atlantic Alliance to Pan-European Entente for Peace and Jobs* (1983/4) (Chew and Denmark, 1996).

### **Contributions of A. G. Frank**

Andre Gunder Frank as part of his contribution towards development studies in phases outlined the trends in development. This paper adopted the second, fourth and fifth pillars as put together by Chew and Denmark, 1996). The second pillar is the process of capital accumulation as the motor force of [world system] history. Wallerstein and others regard continuous capital accumulation as the differentia specifica of the 'modern world-system.' I argue that in this regard the 'modern' world system is not so different and that this same process of capital accumulation has played a, if not the, central role in the world system for several millennia (see especially 1991b and Gills and Frank 1990/91 as well as replies by Amin 1991 and by Wallerstein 1991, the latter also on the difference a hyphen [-] makes, which are also included in Frank and Gills, 1993). The forth pillar is the alternation between hegemony and rivalry or the regional hegemonies and rivalries to succeed the previous hegemony. The world system and international relations literature has recently produced many good analyses of alternation between hegemonic leadership and rivalry for hegemony in the world system since 1492, for instance by Wallerstein (1979), or since 1494 by Modelski (1987) and by Modelski and Thompson (1988). However, hegemony and rivalry for the same also mark world [system] history long before that (Gills and Frank, 1992, Frank and Gills, 1992). We have also discovered that hegemony has been both very rare and quite temporary.

The fifth pillar is the long (and short) economic cycles of alternating ascending (sometimes denominated 'A') phases and descending (sometimes denominated 'B') phases. In the real world historical process and in its analysis by students of the 'modern'; world systems, these long cycles are also associated with each of the previous categories. That is, an important characteristic of the 'modern' world system is that the process of capital accumulation, changes in center-periphery position within it, and world system hegemony and rivalry are all cyclical and occur in tandem with each other. I analyzed the same for the 'modern' world system under the title *World Accumulation 1492-1789 and Dependent Accumulation and Underdevelopment* (1978a, b) (Chew and Denmark, 1996).

### **Contributions of F. H. Cardoso**

Former Brazilian President Fernando Henrique Cardoso summarized his version of dependency theory as follows:

- there is a financial and technological penetration by the developed capitalist centers of the countries of the periphery and semi-periphery;
- this produces an unbalanced economic structure both within the peripheral societies and between them and the centers;
- this leads to limitations on self-sustained growth in the periphery;
- this favors the appearance of specific patterns of class relations;
- These require modifications in the role of the state to guarantee both the functioning of the economy and the political articulation of a society, which contains, within itself, foci of inarticulateness and structural imbalance.

Tausch (2003), based on works of Amin from 1973 to 1997, lists the following main characteristics of periphery capitalism:

1. Regression in both agriculture and small scale industry characterizes the period after the onslaught of foreign domination and colonialism
2. Unequal international specialization of the periphery leads to the concentration of activities in export oriented agriculture and or mining. Some industrialization of the periphery is possible under the condition of low wages, which, together with rising productivity, determine that unequal exchange sets in (double factorial terms of trade  $< 1.0$ ; see Raffer, 1987)
3. These structures determine in the long run a rapidly growing tertiary sector with hidden unemployment and the rising importance of rent in the overall social and economic system
4. Chronic current account balance deficits, re-exported profits of foreign investments, and deficient business cycles at the periphery that provide important markets for the centers during world economic upswings
5. Structural imbalances in the political and social relationships, inter alia a strong 'compradore' element and the rising importance of state capitalism and an indebted state class (Tausch, 2003)

**Dependency theory** or ***dependencia* theory** is a body of social science theories predicated on the notion that resources flow from a "periphery" of poor and underdeveloped states to a "core" of wealthy states, enriching the latter at the expense of the former. It is a central contention of dependency theory that poor states are impoverished and rich ones enriched by the way poor states are integrated into the "world system." The theory arose as a reaction to modernization theory, an earlier theory of development which held that all societies progress through similar stages of development, that today's underdeveloped areas are thus in a similar situation to that of today's developed areas at some time in the past, and that therefore the task in helping the underdeveloped areas out of poverty is to accelerate them along this supposed common path of development, by various means such as investment, technology transfers, and closer integration into the world market. Dependency theory rejected this view, arguing that underdeveloped countries are not merely primitive versions of developed countries, but have unique features and structures of their own; and, importantly, are in the situation of being the weaker members in a world market economy

The premises of dependency theory are that:

1. Poor nations provide natural resources, cheap labor, a destination for obsolete technology, and markets for developed nations, without which the latter could not have the standard of living they enjoy.
2. Wealthy nations actively perpetuate a state of dependence by various means. This influence may be multifaceted, involving economics, media control, politics, banking and finance, education, culture, sport, and all aspects of human resource development (including recruitment and training of workers).

3. Wealthy nations actively counter attempts by dependent nations to resist their influences by means of economic sanctions and/or the use of military force.

Dependency theory states that the poverty of the countries in the periphery is not because they are not integrated into the world system, or not 'fully' integrated as is often argued by free market economists, but because of *how* they are integrated into the system.

Dependency theory originates with two papers published in 1949 – one by Hans Singer, one by Raúl Prebisch – in which the authors observe that the terms of trade for underdeveloped countries relative to the developed countries had deteriorated over time: the underdeveloped countries were able to purchase fewer and fewer manufactured goods from the developed countries in exchange for a given quantity of their raw materials exports. This idea is known as the Singer-Prebisch thesis. Prebisch, an Argentine economist at the United Nations Commission for Latin America (UNCLA), went on to conclude that the underdeveloped nations must employ some degree of protectionism in trade if they were to enter a self-sustaining development path. He argued that Import-substitution industrialisation (ISI), not a trade-and-export orientation, was the best strategy for underdeveloped countries. The theory was developed from a Marxian perspective by Paul A. Baran in 1957 with the publication of his *The Political Economy of Growth* (Vernengo, 2004). Dependency theory shares many points with earlier, Marxist, theories of imperialism by Rosa Luxemburg and V.I. Lenin, and has attracted continued interest from Marxists. Matias Vernengo, a University of Utah economist, identifies two main streams in dependency theory: the Latin American Structuralist, typified by the work of Prebisch, Celso Furtado and Anibal Pinto at the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLAC, or, in Spanish, CEPAL); and the American Marxist, developed by Paul A. Baran, Paul Sweezy, and Andre Gunder Frank (Vernengo, 2004). The theory was popular in the 1960s and 1970s as a criticism of modernization theory (the "stages" hypothesis mentioned above), which was falling increasingly out of favor because of continued widespread poverty in much of the world.

Baran placed surplus extraction and capital accumulation at the center of his analysis. Development depends on a population's producing more than it needs for bare subsistence (a surplus). Further, some of that surplus must be used for capital accumulation - the purchase of new means of production - if development is to occur; spending the surplus on things like luxury consumption does not produce development. Baran noted two predominant kinds of economic activity in poor countries. In the older of the two, plantation agriculture, which originated in colonial times, most of the surplus goes to the landowners, who use it to emulate the consumption patterns of wealthy people in the developed world; much of it thus goes to purchase foreign produced luxury items—automobiles, clothes, etc. -- and little is accumulated for investing in development. The more recent kind of economic activity in the periphery is industry—but of a particular kind. It is usually carried out by foreigners, although often in conjunction with local interests. It is often under special tariff protection or other government concessions. The surplus from this production mostly goes to two places: part of it is sent back to the foreign shareholders as profit; the other part is spent on conspicuous consumption in a similar fashion to that of the plantation aristocracy. Again, little is used for development. Baran thought that political revolution was necessary to break this pattern (Vernengo, 2004).

They cited the partly successful attempts at industrialisation in Latin America around that time (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico) as evidence for this hypothesis. They were led to the position that dependency is not a relation between commodity exporters and industrialised countries, but between countries with different degrees of industrialisation. The third-world debt crisis of the 1980s and continued stagnation in Africa and Latin America in the 1990s caused some doubt as to the feasibility or desirability of "dependent development" (Vernengo, 2004). Vernengo (2004) has suggested that the *sine qua non* of the dependency relationship is not the difference in technological sophistication, as traditional dependency theorists believe, but rather the difference in financial strength between core and peripheral countries – particularly the inability of peripheral countries to borrow in their own currency. He believes that the hegemonic position of the United States is very strong because of the importance of its financial markets and because it controls the international reserve currency – the US dollar. He believes that the end of the Bretton Woods international financial agreements in the early 1970s

considerably strengthened the United States' position because it removed some constraints on their financial actions.

"Standard" dependency theory differs from Marxism, in arguing against internationalism and any hope of progress in less developed nations towards industrialization and a liberating revolution. Theotonio dos Santos described a 'new dependency', which focused on both the internal and external relations of less-developed countries of the periphery, derived from a Marxian analysis. Former Brazilian President Fernando Henrique Cardoso wrote extensively on dependency theory while in political exile, arguing that it was an approach to studying the economic disparities between the centre and periphery. The American sociologist Immanuel Wallerstein refined the Marxist aspect of the theory, and called it the "World-system." It has also been associated with Galtung's Structural Theory of Imperialism.

*"The inflow of capital from the developed countries is the prerequisite for the establishment of economic dependence. This inflow takes various forms: loans granted on onerous terms; investments that place a given country in the power of the investors; almost total technological subordination of the dependent country to the developed country; control of a country's foreign trade by the big international monopolies; and in extreme cases, the use of force as an economic weapon in support of the other forms of exploitation."*

— Che Guevara (1964), Marxist revolutionary.

### **Contributions of G. Myrdal**

Professor Emeritus Gunnar Myrdal (1972) as cited in (Agbo, 2003) examines three aspects of the problem of development, namely, underdevelopment, the process of development, and planning for development, a model which applied in his study of the political, social and economic system of South Asia. Myrdal asserts that researchers must view development as multidimensional, both in ideals and in reality. The study of development should include both economic and non-economic factors such as health, education and other social needs. Myrdal's model assumes that countries are social systems and development occurs when the whole social system moves upwards. The social system consists of many interrelated conditions and a change in one condition would cause a change in others. Thus, Myrdal's model is an attempt to synthesize the many different thoughts espoused by the theories of development, as most of these theories focus on one direction and, therefore, appear confusing.

### **Contributions of A. Sen**

#### **Fundamental freedoms and human rights**

Sen has advocated new approaches to thinking about fundamental freedoms and human rights. In the past, poverty and hunger were often excluded from dominant discourses on fundamental freedoms and human rights. Sen has challenged this approach, arguing that: 'When we assess inequalities across the world in being able to avoid preventable morbidity, or escapable hunger, or premature mortality, we are not merely examining differences in well-being... The available data regarding the realization of disease, hunger, and early mortality tell us a great deal about the presence or absence of certain central basic freedoms' (1992, 69). Sen has rejected the 'outcome-independent' position (which suggests that socio-economic outcomes are generally irrelevant to ethical evaluation), and has called for the development of 'consequence-sensitive' approaches to the characterization of freedoms and rights. In Sen's view, the idea that consequences such as life, death, starvation and nourishment are intrinsically matters of moral indifference – or have only very weak intrinsic moral relevance – is 'implausible' and fails to reflect 'complex interdependences' that arise in relation to the exercise and valuation of freedoms and rights in a society (1984,1987). In addition, Sen has rejected exclusively *negative* characterizations of freedoms and rights, focusing attention away from the *absence of intentional coercion* as an exclusive condition of individual freedom, and towards the constituent elements of what a person can actually *do* or *be*. In this conceptual framework, the *absence* or *deprivation* of certain *capabilities* or *real opportunities* – as well as the denial of political and civil liberties – are relevant to the characterization of freedoms and rights, and poverty as well as tyranny, poor economic opportunities as well as systematic social deprivation, and neglect of public facilities as well as intolerance or over activity of repressive states' can all represent major sources of unfreedom.

The distinction between agency and well-being and between freedom and achievement can be clarified with an example. Suppose two sisters, Anna and Becca, live in peaceful village in England and have the same achieved well-being levels. Both of them believe that the power of global corporations is undermining democracy, and that governments should prioritize global justice and the fight against poverty in the South instead of taking care of the interests of global corporations. Anna decides to travel to an Italian town to demonstrate against the G8 meetings, while Becca stays home. At that moment Anna is using her agency freedom to voice some of her political concerns. However, the Italian police does not like the protesters and violates Anna's civil and political rights by beating her up in prison. Obviously Anna's achieved well-being has lowered considerably (as has her standard of living). Anna is offered to sign a piece of paper declaring that she committed violence organized by an extreme-left organization (which will give her a criminal record and ban her from any further G8-demonstrations). If she does not sign, she will be kept in prison for a further unspecified time. At that moment, Anna has a (highly constrained) option to trade off her agency freedom for higher achieved well-being, which our heroine refuses. Becca had the same agency freedom to voice her concerns and protest against either the G8 itself or the way the Italian police officers abused their power, but chose not to do so. She is concerned about the hollowing of democracy, the protection of human rights and the fascist tendencies among some police officers, but does not want to sacrifice her well-being to achieve these agency goals (Robeyns, 2003).

### **Individual entitlements**

Sen's 'entitlement approach' provides a framework for analyzing the relationship between rights, interpersonal obligations and *individual entitlement to things*. A person's *entitlement set* is a way of characterizing his or her 'overall command over things' taking note of all relevant rights and obligations. Whereas rights are generally characterized as relationships that hold between distinct agents (e.g. between one person and another person, or one person and the state), a person's entitlements 'are the totality of things he can have by virtue of his rights'. Sen has hypothesized that 'most cases of starvation and famines across the world arise not from people being deprived of things to which they are entitled, but from people not being entitled, in the prevailing legal system of institutional rights, to adequate means for survival'. His empirical work suggests that in many famines in which millions of people have died, there was no overall decline in food availability, and starvation occurred as a consequence of shifts in entitlements resulting from exercising rights that were legitimate in legal terms. It establishes that a range of variables other than agricultural productivity and aggregate food supply can undermine a person's entitlement to food, and that there is a possibility of an *asymmetry* in the incidence of starvation deaths among different population groups, with entitlement failures arising not only because of overall food shortages, but because people are unable to trade their labor power or skills. These findings highlight the possibility of insecure food entitlements that do not result from market failure as traditionally understood – challenging approaches to general equilibrium analysis that rule out the possibility of starvation death due to inability to acquire sufficient food through production or exchange (1981, 1984b).

### **Functioning and capability**

Sen's concept of *functioning* relates to the things a person may value doing or being. *Functionings* are features of a person's state of existence ranging from relatively elementary states (e.g. being adequately nourished), to complex personal states and activities (e.g. participation and appearing without shame). The concept of *capability* relates to the ability of a person to achieve different combinations of functionings – the various combinations of valuable *beings* and *doings* that are within a person's reach, reflecting the *opportunity* or *freedom* to choose a life that a person values. Sen's empirical research has highlighted the possibility of divergences between the expansion of economic growth and income on the one hand, and the expansion of valuable human capabilities on the other. His findings establish that economic growth and income can be poor predictors of the capability to live to a mature age, without succumbing to premature mortality, in different countries (e.g. India, China, Sri Lanka, Costa Rica, Jamaica), and for different population groups (e.g. women versus men; black men versus other groups in the US; the population in the Indian state of Kerela in relation to other states). For these reasons, Sen has proposed that capabilities and functionings may be the most appropriate focal variables for many

evaluative exercises concerning human interests. Equality and inequality may be best assessed in terms of capabilities – rather than in terms of GDP, consumption or utility – while poverty may be best characterised in terms of the *absence* or *deprivation* of certain basic capabilities *to do this* or *to be that* (1992,1999a).

A person's functionings and her capability are closely related but distinct. "A functioning is an achievement, whereas a capability is the ability to achieve. Functionings are, in a sense, more directly related to living conditions, since they *are* different aspects of living conditions. Capabilities, in contrast, are notions of freedom, in the positive sense: what real opportunities you have regarding the life you may lead" (Sen, 1987: 36).

The first clarification that needs to be made is to ask whether the capability approach is a well-defined theory, or something broader, like a paradigm. In its most broad form, the capability approach can indeed be considered to be a paradigm. However, not everyone uses it as such. It could help to distinguish between three different levels at which the capability approach is operating:

1. As a framework of thought for the evaluation of individual advantage and social arrangements
2. As a critique of other approaches to the evaluation of well-being and justice
3. As a formula or algorithm to make interpersonal comparisons of welfare or wellbeing, Ingrid Robeyns, 2003.

Second, with her focus on the design of a just constitution, Nussbaum proposes a list of ten central human capabilities: 1. Life; 2. Bodily health; 3. Bodily integrity; 4. Senses, imagination and thought; 5. Emotions; 6. Practical reason; 7. Affiliation; 8. Other species; 9. Play; 10. Control over one's environment. Nussbaum has specified this list in more detail in several of her recent publications (Nussbaum, 2000; 2002a; 2002b; 2003a).

### **Multidimensional concepts of poverty and development**

The UNDP's *Human Development Reports* are based on Sen's approach and characterise human development in terms of the expansion of valuable human capabilities. The *Human Development Index* captures the importance of three critical human capabilities – achieving knowledge, longevity and a decent standard of living. The *Gender-Related Development Index* captures gender-based inequalities in the achievement of these capabilities, while the *Human Poverty Index* captures deprivations (where 'living standard' is characterised in terms of access to safe water, health services and birth-weight). The **World Bank's** *World Development Report 2000-01* also adopts a multidimensional concept of poverty. It attempts to go beyond the analysis of achieved functionings and to accommodate the ideas of individual agency and rights by emphasising that poverty is more than inadequate income and human development – it is also vulnerability and lack of voice, power and representation.

### **Conclusion**

The phenomenon of underdevelopment must be viewed in both national and an international context. Problems of poverty, low productivity, population growth, unemployment, primary product export dependence, and international vulnerability have both domestic and global origins and potential solutions. Economic and social forces, both internal and external, are therefore responsible for the poverty, inequality, and low productivity that characterize most Third World nations. The successful pursuit of economic and social development will require not only the formulation of appropriate strategies within the Third World but also a modification of the present international economic order to make it more responsive to the development needs of poor nations (West and Dassi, (nd) as see Odia, 2015).

This paper holds that a critical evaluation of the ethnography of development sociology is quintessential to every development researcher/analyst as the framework of its evolution/analysis are well situated in proper context subject to orientations/perspectives of contributing scholars.

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