

Theoretical Aspects of Pierre Bourdieu and Rogers Brubaker and its Use for the Study of Nations and Nationalism

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Abstract: The following paper is dealing with the topic of nations and nationalism. After giving a general overview of the mainstream work conducted regarding the national subject, the paper will in the first place focus on Bourdieu's so called scholastic view which can be summarized as the bias between a scientific, theoretical reason and the practical reason that is applied by the social actors in the daily life. Taking this major assumption into account, the paper will introduce a new approach, against the strict macro- or micro pattern of understanding, to analyze and describe the phenomenon nation or nationalism. This will be carried out by referring to the work of Brubaker who defines ethnicity, nation or race not as things or entities in the world but rather views on the world standing for dynamic and flexible categories. It will be then the main task to integrate the habitus concept of Bourdieu into the theoretical structure of Brubaker in order to provide the link that combines the claimed overcome of the stiff division between macro- and micro analysis of nations. The outcome shall be a so called and to be defined national habitus that on the one hand brings up national features of the habitus of social actors and on the other hand provides us with explanatory models of how the habitus influences, explains and clarifies the national category.

Keywords: Nation, Nationalism, Habitus, Groupism, Bourdieu, Brubaker.

Introduction

“[Nations] are, in my view, dual phenomena, constructed essentially from above, but which cannot be understood unless also analyzed from below, that is in terms of the assumptions, hopes, needs, longings and interest of ordinary people, which are not necessarily national and still less nationalist.”

(Hobsbawm 1990, p.10)

Over decades of research related to nations and nationalism one can find a wide range of works that follow different approaches in order to explain how such a young concept could gain this influential position in our daily life and dominate the whole world with its division of nationalities and nation-states.² This introduction will start with a rough review of the most important of them and their theoretical implications. Benedict Anderson can be accounted as one of the classics in the field of studies about nations and nationalism. In his main work, *Imagined Communities*, (Anderson 1991) the title contains the main concept, regarding national communities as imagined communities that took over since religious and dynastic patterns got marginalized over the time. This type of a national community served as a role model and became over the years the most powerful scheme using cover-up tactics in order to create a myth of a national, genetic predestination.

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² And it is the strong belief of the author that there will be no end to this dominant position of the national concept in the near future. “As the name of the ‘United Nations’ already reveals, the world society today is politically composed of nation-states. (Habermas 1999, p. 281)

Another groundwork centered on nations and nationalism was conducted by Ernest Gellner that also tries to explain the spread of nations as the role model for any kind of modern society all over the planet. (cp. Gellner 1997 and Gellner 1983) Due to Gellner it is the industrialization that plays a key role for understanding these major changes that caused a mandatory change in the relationship between states and culture which compulsory lead to the nationalism as we can find it today. A so called switch from intra-community training to exo-training (Gellner 1983, p. 31) called for a powerful state that norms and standardizes the education – the position that was filled out by the nation-state.

Another national theorist that is criticizing Gellner for his approach that “[...] makes it difficult to pay adequate attention to the view from below [...] [the view of] the ordinary persons.” (Hobsbawm 1990, p.11) is the work *Nations and Nationalism since 1780* (cp. Hobsbawm 1990) by E. J. Hobsbawm. His book is providing a detailed survey of nationalism in Europe since 1780, drawing the detailed development of historical events, dealing less with theoretical foundations for explaining the rise of nations but giving a socio-historical treatise. Even though Hobsbawm is calling for an approach that is also integrating micro aspects of the phenomenon, he fails to provide a guideline for doing so and remains on the step of a pure, tough historically detailed, macro analysis when he defines nationalism as a purely “political programme”. (Hobsbawm 1999, p. 256)

Newer approaches that try to be more flexible and dynamic trying to overcome the gap between a pure macro analysis and micro parameters are as follows:

For example, Otto Bauer is integrating an individual and subjective dimension into the studies of nations when he is introducing the concept of a national character: “The question of the nation can only be approached from the concept of national character. Let us provisionally define national character as the complex of physical and mental characteristics that distinguishes one nation from others [...]” (Bauer 1999, p. 40) And also the very latest study from the renown Pew Research Center (cp. Pew Research Center 2017) gives very good and useful hints and guidelines of how the concept of a nation cannot only be defined from above, with governmental structures, propaganda or comparative historical research but with asking what is really relevant for the interviewees for accounting a specific person to a nation or not.¹

Another fruitful opinion condensing in a life work belongs to the former student of Gellner, Anthony D. Smith, introducing the concept of a so called *ethno-symbolistic* approach towards nations and nationalism (cp. Smith 2009) which tries to bring in aspects of nationalism that had been taking place and existing in pre-modern times. “Smith argues that ethnic identity is not a recent invention. Rather there were ethnies which can be traced back – at least for Europe and the Middle East - centuries, if not millennia.” (Breuilly 1999, p. 150) These so called *ethnies* are in the opinion of Smith the persecutors of the modern nations and therefore have to be integrated into each analysis covering a more subjective and culture-based methodology. “Only by grasping the power of nationalism and the continuing appeal of national identity through their rootedness in pre-modern ethnic symbolism and modes of organization is there some chance of understanding the resurgence of ethnic nationalism at a time when ‘objective’ conditions might appear to render it obsolete.” (Smith 1996, p. 7)

Last but surely not least even a theorist that started his work in the beginning of the 20th century, Carlton J. H. Hayes, (cp. Hayes 1926) is stressing the subjective dimensions of a phenomenon such as nationalism that he is comparing with religion. In his main work *Nationalism – A Religion* that contains a more historical exegesis of nationalism and listing the similarities between a religion and a nation that took over the place and importance of the former belief (cp. Hayes 1960) he is summing it up as follows: “Nationalism, like any religion, calls into play not simply the will, but the intellect, the imagination, and the emotions. (Hayes 1960, p. 164)

¹ The main finding of this study is that all over the world, for instance in the US, Canada, Europe, Australia or Japan, the language matters more to national identity than for example the birthplace or passport a person holds.

The above sketched overview of available and renowned theories on nations and nationalism¹ will lead us directly to the main topic and general issue of this paper which is not less than an extension of which the author believes that I wasn't carried out so far and will help to deepen the understanding of nations and nationalism as well as it does provide a fruitful methodological approach serving as a guideline for further studies. The aspects that will be mentioned in the following might release a pulse that is able to overcome the division of micro or macro centered research on nations or nationalism. This new approach will start out with the basic assumption of Pierre Bourdieu and his claim and call for rethinking the own view of the scientist and establishing a "Science of the Science". (Cp. Bourdieu 2004) This leads him to his strong belief that "The progress of discovery of the Social Sciences is depended on a progress of finding out about the conditions of discovery." (Bourdieu 1987, p. 7) what we will also try to adopt in our studies of nations and nationalism in order to avoid the criticized *scholastic view*. (Cp. Bourdieu 1998 (1)) that is putting the theoretical reason of the scientist higher than the daily practice and reason of the social actors. The so called Game Theory will provide us with an illustrative example of the wrong and unrealistic outcome that comes along with the application of the scholastic view in chapter 2.2.²

Central for the argument of this paper will be the work and theory of Rogers Brubaker who tries to establish a new form of how we look at phenomenon such as nations, ethnicity or race. "Ethnicity, race, and nation should be conceptualized not as substances or things or entities or organisms or collective individuals-as the imagery of discrete, concrete, tangible, bounded, and enduring 'groups' encourages us to do-but rather in relational, processual, dynamic, eventful, and disaggregated terms." (Brubaker 2004, p. 11) For him a nation is rather a view on the world than real thing in the world whereas he is surely following the social constructivism as laid out by Berger and Luckmann. (Cp. Berger and Luckmann 1966) Brubaker's approach wants to combine, taking macro and micro measurements into account, interdisciplinary methods and concepts in order to determine what a nation and the transferred categories that come along with it are really about and most important what they mean to the people that are using it and are the holders of a national classification. The main works of Brubaker are more or less a collection of essays and papers that are centered around his above mentioned approach (cp. Brubaker 2004 and Brubaker 2015) whereas practical applications come shorter.³ By connecting now Brubaker's point of view and the theoretical assumptions of Bourdieu, namely his famous concept of habitus, this paper will try to show that the habitus model of Pierre Bourdieu, understood as "[...] a system of durable, transposable dispositions which functions as the generative basis of structured, objectively unified practices [...]" (Bourdieu 1972, preface, VII) will provide the practical tool for analyzing the daily, social practice of the national actors without leaving the macro level behind.

The explanations of chapter three do exactly follow this main aim and goal of this paper what is showing that the habitus is the missing link that brings the assumptions of Brubaker, that are so important to the studies of nations and nationalism, on a level of practical application which is due to the unique habitus concept developed by Bourdieu. "The habitus is not only a structuring structure, which organizes practices and the perception of practices, but also a structured structure: the principle of division into logical classes which organizes the perception of the social world is itself the product of internalization of the division into social classes." (Bourdieu 1984, p. 170) By integrating the habitus into the research of nations one can on the one hand find new habitual features that are playing a role while defining such a phenomenon on the other hand the scientist will be able to search and bring up national dimensions that are integrated in each individual habitus. By doing so, and the following chapters will carry out this theoretical considerations, a new depth of analysis can be reached and a innovative momentum for the

¹ Of course there are way more theories, authors, journals, etc. that are having nations and nationalism as their topic and publishing in this regard. Nevertheless, the selection presented here can be seen as the mainstream theories and more or less all other theoretical works are orientated towards it.

² Also Gellner's very macro-driven view on the phenomenon nation can be called in this regard since he is totally leaving out the daily live, needs and restraints of the actors that had to deal with alterations that were brought up by the industrialization. (cp. Gellner 1983)

³ Even though a very practical and helpful guide line is provided through his field work in a Transylvanian Town. (cp. Brubaker 2006)

examination of nations and nationalism will become clear while the trap of the scholastic view with its admonitory example of the Game Theory will be circumvented.

Theoretical Aspects of the work of Pierre Bourdieu

The scholastic view

“Every project for the development of the human spirit which, forgetting the historical grounding of reason, depends on the sole force of reason and rational discourse to advance the causes of reason, and which does not appeal to political struggle aimed at endowing reason and freedom with the properly political instruments which are the precondition of their realization in history, remains prisoner of the scholastic illusion.

(Bourdieu 1998 (1), p. 140)

A very general assumption that appears before every theoretical thinking is that all progress within the Social sciences is based on the discovery and insight about the social preconditions of the research process. “The progress of discovery of the Social Sciences is depended on a progress of finding out about the conditions of discovery.” (Bourdieu 1987, p. 7, translation by the author)¹ Hence the scientist has to be successful in “[...] objectifying the objective and subjective relation to the object.” (Bourdieu 1987, p. 7, translation by the author)² before he approaches to be explored issue. The related and mostly problematic deductions of these assumptions will be later on explained when it comes to the so called *scholastic view*.

Furthermore, a critical, sociological science that is aiming at objectivity has to look intensively at the dominant and prevalent schemata in order to not adopt categories of thinking just because they are used for many years. Of course this does not mean that one has to reinvent the wheel again and again but it is for example anything else than helpful to keep on using a methodical distortion just to keep the gained data comparable with the one from before. The above mentioned insight was achieved by Bourdieu throughout his research in Algeria. Hereby he discovered obvious contraries for example during wedding ceremonies and was searching compulsively for the “[...] perfect coherence of the system.” (Bourdieu 1987, p. 25, translation by the author)³ But in the end he came to the conclusion that this was a mistake to “[...] trying to solve these contraries instead of accepting it from the very beginning.” (Bourdieu 1987, p. 25, translation by the author)⁴ which was conducted due to his default categories of thinking. Trying to synchronize the social practice and especially the one from another culture with the default organizing principle of a *naïve science* that can never be thought independently from its own culture, is an error from the very beginning and can never lead to a proper result. “Our head and our language are full of pre-constructed objects and that is why the break with these pre-constructions, the presumptions, spontaneous theorizing are virulent and of utmost importance for the sociology; in any case and due to my opinion 2/3 of all research projects transform social problems into sociological problems. (Bourdieu 1991 (5), p. 271, translation by the author)⁵

To give a further description of Bourdieu’s theoretical exegesis of sciences one can come up with his criticism of two totally different and contrary schools of thought namely Lazarsfeld and Adorno. Former got famous for his innovative study from 1933 *Die Arbeitslosen von Marienthal* (Lazarsfeld et al., 1933) but in the opinion of Bourdieu his naïve positivistic work is as one-sided as the approach of the latter

¹ Der Fortschritt der Erkenntnis setzt bei den Sozialwissenschaften einen Fortschritt im Erkennen der Bedingung der Erkenntnis voraus.

² [...] das objektive und subjektive Verhältnis zum Objekt weiter zu objektivieren.

³ Perfekte Geschlossenheit des Systems

⁴ [...] diese Widersprüche zu lösen, anstatt sie von vornherein zu akzeptieren.

⁵ Unser Kopf und unsere Sprache sind voll von präkonstruierten Objekten und deshalb ist der Bruch mit den Präkonstruktionen, den Vorbegriffen, der Spontantheorie, in der Soziologie auch ganz besonders wichtig; ohnehin wird ja meiner Meinung nach in Dreiviertel aller Untersuchungen nichts anderes gemacht, als soziale Problem in soziologische Probleme zu verwandeln.

which stay for the so called *Frankfurter Schule*. This one is too “theoreticalistic” (Bourdieu 1991 (5), p. 270) and hence is neglecting the empirical side of social facts too much. The approach of Bourdieu tries to overcome the differences of the two above mentioned theories and this means for the daily work of a scientist including his research and teaching “[...] that you don’t only have to teach how to gather data and work with it but also how to construct the object for which the data was gathered – not only teaching how to perform the coding but which implications come along with the process of coding – not only how to construct a questionnaire but also how to construct a certain question starting from the statement of a problem. (Bourdieu 1991, p. 270, translation by the author)¹ Both theories, whether Lazarsfeld or Adorno, with all its implications, categories of thinking and instructions for gaining knowledge regarding sociological questions, do often prohibit a deep and objective understanding of the object. These methods that are criticized by Bourdieu have get discarded in order to circumvent a methodology “[...] that has to be obeyed, not to understand the object itself but to be recognized as a connoisseur of the object. (Bourdieu 1991, p. 281, translation by the author)²

The previous reflections on Bourdieu’s theoretical heritage might also explain why he and his work always were facing an enormous criticism from all kind of theoretical views. One of the main disagreements always stated his connection to Algeria and France (cp. Bourdieu 1979 and Bourdieu 2000) which was not transferrable to other societies. Obviously this criticism is quite naïve and simple and the answer of Bourdieu himself marks another theoretical cornerstone of his work:

“The one who criticize that my research findings are too *French* did not understand that the most important part are not the findings but the process within they are brought up. Theories are programs of research that shouldn’t evoke theoretical discussions but for a practical implementation with which they can be disproved or generalized.” (Bourdieu 1991 (5), p. 276, translation by the author)³ Thus also Bourdieu’s works from the 1960’s in Algeria are from enormous importance for the actual research of the Social Sciences and not for nothing he himself describes his concerning book *Algérie 60. Structures économiques et structures temporelles* (Bourdieu 1977) as his “[...] earliest but maybe most contemporary book. (Bourdieu 2000, blurb)

Another fundamental assumption that refers to the so called scholastic view is the break with a science that claims to be pure and unbiased, providing the true knowledge. On the contrary for Bourdieu the science is a field such as the arts or religion, within fights and struggles for power are fought and which is highly influenced by the interest and division of capital by the players that join the certain field. To put it in a nutshell, the players fight for the power of definition which enables the owners to define what is the mainstream and the *truth* of their part of the sciences. Generally, one has to be aware of the very important matter of fact that “[...] the scientific field is a social world like others within, just like the other fields, it is all about power, capital, balance of power, maintaining – or subversion strategies, interest, etc. and that it is a world with its own laws in order to function. (Bourdieu 1987, p. 88, translation by the author)⁴

¹ [...] dass man nicht nur lehren muss, wie man Daten aufbereitet und verarbeitet, sondern auch wie man das Objekt konstruiert, für das diese Daten erhoben werden; nicht nur, wie man kodiert, sondern auch wie man die Implikationen aufdeckt, die in einer Kodierung stecken; nicht nur wie man Fragebogen macht, sondern auch, wie man einen Satz von Fragen ausgehend von einer Problemstellung konstruiert.

² [...] an die man sich halten muss, nicht um das Objekt zu erkennen, sondern um als Kenner des Objekts anerkannt zu werden.

³ Diejenigen, die kritisieren, dass meine Forschungsergebnisse zu französisch sind, haben nicht begriffen, dass das Wichtige nicht die Ergebnisse sind, sondern der Prozess, in dem sie erarbeitet werden. Theorien sind Forschungsprogramme, die nicht zur theoretischen Diskussion anregen sollen, sondern zur praktischen Umsetzung, über die sie dann verallgemeinert werden können.

⁴ [...] dass das wissenschaftliche Feld eine soziale Welt wie die anderen ist, in der es wie anderswo um Macht, Kapital, Kräfteverhältnisse, Erhaltungs- oder Subversionsstrategien, Interessen, usw. geht, und dass es eine Welt für sich ist, mit eigenen Gesetzen für ihr Funktionieren.

The former will consequently lead us to the by J.L. Austin in his monumental work *Sense and Sensibilia* (cp. Austin 1962) titled *scholastic view* which means a special way of thinking which is adopted and conducted by scientists. To put it in the words of Bourdieu it is the objectification “[...] of what does our thinking [of the scientist] owe to the fact that it is produced within an academic space.” (Bourdieu 1998 (2), p. 203, translation by the author)¹ To understand the deepness of this thought, one has to put a stress on the setting of the daily life practice of the scholastic view what condenses in a specific scientific habitus.

To analyze the connected problems and issues it is necessary to search for the social pre-conditions which presume the formation of scholastic view. Maybe it occurs not very important if a certain sort of capital, let us assume *time*, and is not available. But only enough time and muse will enable a person to be successful in the field of science. A lower class household simply does have other problems and needs (economic restraints, lack of time, etc.) which holds these people back from entering the scientific field. Only a life that is disconnected from everyday sorrows and necessities provides a basis that is able to form the habitus that is needed to adopt a *playful* relation towards scientific questions and problems. “To truly enter these universes where context-free practices or utterances are produced, one must dispose of time, of skhole, and also have this disposition to play gratuitous games which is acquired and reinforced by situations of skhole, such as the inclination and the ability to raise speculative problems for sole pleasure of resolving them, and not because they are posed, often quite urgently, by the necessities of life, to treat language not as an instrument but as an object of contemplation, delight or speculation. (Bourdieu 1998 (1), p. 128 ff.)

By thinking about the role which the science has in our society, one becomes aware of the problems that come along if this science is dominated by the scholastic view. Hence and due to Bourdieu the scientific institutes claim the “privilege of the general” (Bourdieu 1998 (2), p. 205, translation by the author)² which can be also described as the right for advancement of knowledge and its production. For instance, there are comprehensive discussions about terms that are invented and published by the science without scrutinizing the root and conditions of the invention of the certain terms. Does for example the term of precariat play a role in the life and social practice of somebody who is counted to this social group? Wouldn't it be much more important instead of stressing on demotivation deficits of the workless, to analyze the governmental and social mechanism that determine the situation? Very often the scientist will simply project his cognitive structure on the social actors which in the first place does not provide a proper approach to the social reality and secondly cannot help to solve social deficits. “[...] I would say that ignoring everything that is implicated in the ‘scholastic point of view’ leads to the most serious epistemological mistake in the human sciences, namely, that which consist in putting ‘a scholar inside the machine’, in picturing all social agents in the image of the scientist [...] or more precisely to place the models that the scientist must construct to account for practices into the consciousness of agents, to operate as if the constructions that the scientist must produce to understand and account for practices were the main determinants, the actual cause of practice.” (Bourdieu 1998 (1), p. 133) This bias between the social reality and the thoughts and theoretical structures that are built by the scientist can be titled as the difference between a practical reasons of the social actor against the theoretical reason of the player within the scientific field.

Theory of games - Theoretical reason vs. practical reason

Taking the above mentioned theoretical thoughts and guidelines of Bourdieu into account, one can find an obvious example of the bias between a theoretical reason applied by the scientist and the practical reason of the social actor while focusing on the so called *game theory*, invented by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern. (Cp. Neumann and Morgenstern 1944) This theory became very famous in the recent years especially in the field of economics and was applied for various situations, scenarios and problems. It would go beyond the boundaries of this paper to explain its applications and theoretical

¹ [...] was unser Wissen der Tatsache schuldet, dass es in einem akademischen Raum produziert wird.

² Privileg des Allgemeinen

facets in detail whereas the work of Dixit et al. provided a comprehensive overview of the whole theoretical spectrum of the game theory. (cp. Dixit et al. 2009) For our purpose it is enough to comprehend this approach as a strictly mathematical model of cooperation or conflict between actors that are rational decision-makers. The main stress hereby lies on the rational way of how the social actors, for example in a zero-sum game, behave and what are the rational reasons for their decisions that lead him or her to act in this or another way. It becomes clear at the very first moment that this theoretical approach cannot be combined with the assumptions that lead the works of Bourdieu as well as he cannot accept a research that is only centered around the subjective momentums of the social reality. “The rational calculator that the advocates of rational action theory portray as the principle of human practices is no less absurd – even if this does not strike us as much, perhaps because it flatter our ‘spiritual point of honor’ - than the *angelus rector*¹, the far-seeing pilot to which some pre-Newtonian thinkers attributed the regulated movement of the planets.” (Bourdieu/Wacquant 1992, p. 126)

The game theory that claims to provide reliable forecasts of certain situations works with an imagination of the human being that is caused by the scholastic view that was described in the first chapter which all breaks down to the term of the *homo oeconomicus*. This includes the model of an individual that acts rationally in every sense of its meaning which tries to fill theoretical terms such as *Pareto efficiency* or *Nash equilibrium*. (Cp. Fudenberg and Tirol 1991) with a quasi-content. But while doing so exactly this happens what is harshly criticized by Bourdieu - an abstract, in the field of science grown theory will be taken for real and projected on the daily life of the social actor. Blinded by the mathematic correctness that underlies the game theory, a critical review of the published results will be avoided and a search for the matching between the theoretical and the social reality will not be performed. Of course some coherences will be explained through the game theory and the implementation of probabilities make the system more trustworthy, but still it cannot deliver the real reasons of behavior or decision of the social actors. For sure the parameters of the game theory play not the main role why decisions are made or specific strategies are picked in the social practice. There surely do exist for sure other variables (balance of power, capital, etc.) that influence the daily life and its decisions that are most of the time anything else than rational. For example, Bourdieu finds out that in the Kabyle society where he conducted research in the early 1960’s, that their way of acting towards the capitalism that they were suddenly forced to apply, brings up behavior anything else than rational. A society that worked through exchange of goods and where the respect and honor of a family counts more than rational, monetary decision, the game theory leaves us behind without any explanations. (Cp. Bourdieu 2000)

Consequently, a whole discipline should be called into question since the basis and theoretical root of the game theory is based on a scientific reason that can hardly be accounted to explain the social practice of actors that haven’t any deeper connections or real link to the rational model of a *homo oeconomicus*. To sum it up, the theoretical reason of the game theory will never be able to explain the practical reason one can find in the daily social relationships between actors. That is why Bourdieu condemns this approach as well as he does it with a pure subjective point of view that leaves social structures and more general concepts such as a class-habitus (cp. Kraus and Gebauer 2002) out and what brings him to the following theoretical conclusion:

“This leads me to believe that, in order to understand the specific logic of practices that have dispositions as their basis, we must abandon the canonical distinction between explanations based on causes and explanations based on reasons.” (Bourdieu 1998 (1), p. 134)

Bourdieu and Nationalism - Habitus as a key to understand the concept of nations

Brubaker’s theory of nations and nationalism – Bourdieu as the precursor of a cognitive and dynamic understanding of national categories

The following is now trying to integrate the findings of the former chapter into the research and methodological approach for the study of nations and nationalism. Whereas on the first sight the concept

¹ Ruling angel; according to Kepler, the angel or divine being who caused a planet to pursue its course around the sun

and theoretical approach of Bourdieu might be not directly connected to the field of national theorizing, it shall become clear that it is of utmost importance to integrate the general lessons of his work into a scientific research of the topic in order to gain reliable, valid and objective results that represent the daily social practice of the actors instead of projecting a scientific idea and theory on the players in the field, getting the answers that were already dictated by the way of asking. This approach will compulsively lead us to the work of Rogers Brubaker (cp. Brubaker 2004) who is trying to come up with a new idea of how we can understand and grasp such a multi-layered concept as nation and the phenomenon nationalism.

This starts with the point of view that both Bourdieu as well as Brubaker are against a *naturalization* of categories that are always men made and can never be seen as an entity sui generis that existed on the world from always on. "The 'reality' is in this case through and through social and even the most 'natural classification' are based on characteristics that are anything else than natural but mostly the result of random determinations which means the result a former positioning of the balance of power in the field of the struggle for the legitimate demarcation." (Bourdieu 2005, p. 96, translation by the author)¹ For a study of nationalism and nations that also relies heavily on categories, this point of view must be adopted. Brubaker puts it that way by leaving the rigid and stiff structure of so called entities such as ethnicity, nation, etc. aside: "What cognitive perspectives suggest, in short, is that race, ethnicity, and nation are not (!) entities in the world but ways of seeing the world. They are ways of understanding and identifying oneself, making sense of one's problems and predicaments, identifying one's interests, and orienting one's action. They are ways of recognizing, identifying, and classifying other people, of construing sameness and difference, and of "coding" and making sense of their actions (Brubaker 2004, p. 81).

Generally, Brubaker adopts the theoretical view of Bourdieu and their thoughts on how groups are formed and analyzed point at the same direction. For Bourdieu the theories about the view on the *social facts* are not only structuring the present but also predict and dominate the future by influencing the thought patterns. Hence new situations will be viewed in the light of the old point of view, new *findings* will be from the very beginning directed in a certain direction. "One can see the extent to which the social reality of something like alcoholism (and one could say the same of abortion, drug abuse or euthanasia) changes according to whether it is perceived and thought of as a hereditary weakness, a moral failure, a cultural tradition or a way of compensating for something. (Bourdieu 1991 (1), p. 128) In the same way Brubaker argues when it comes to the so called *groupism*, "[...] the tendency to treat ethnic groups, nations, and even races as things-in-the-world, as real, substantial entities with their own cultures, identities, and interests." (Brubaker 2004, p. 78) In his opinion, just as Bourdieu would put it, these stiff concepts and anti-dynamic perception of how we can understand something such as nation, ethnicity or nationalism, always direct the scientist and his research in the same direction that leads to unfruitful results that are not connected to the social reality. This matter of fact that is prohibiting a realistic and fertile approach to the mentioned phenomenon and can be listed as another failure that is conducted due to the scholastic view. One can even go that far and claim that some groups might be only formed and endure due to the fact that scientific narratives are formed and dialogues are held about them.

Hence we have to try while talking about nations to leave the old nomenclature behind and instead of talking about single-acting entities (groupism) work with categories such as Iranian, French or American in order to not influence the interviewees while gathering data. This will help to circumvent the problems discussed by Bourdieu that are going hand in hand with the adoption of the scholastic view. By talking about nations the thoughts that are pre-constructed in the scientist head will be projected to the perception of the holders of the nationality which will influence and distort the results. Instead one must

¹ Die "Realität" ist in diesem Falle durch und durch sozial, und auch die „natürlichste Klassifizierungen“ beruhen auf Merkmalen, die nichts weniger als natürlich sind, sondern größtenteils das Ergebnis willkürlicher Festlegungen, das heißt das Ergebnis eines früheren Stadiums der Machtverhältnisse im Feld der Auseinandersetzungen um die legitime Grenzziehung.

focus on the feelings and the social practice of the actors that might be anything else than national or orientated towards a nation. The scientist will have to find ways and methods to go beyond understanding nations, ethnicity, race and so on as whole entities or independently acting organization but rather achieve a relational and processual comprehension that includes “[...] practical categories, situated acting, cultural expressions, cognitive schemes, discursive patterns of analysis, organizational routine, institutional shapes, political projects and random happenings. (Brubaker 2007, p. 22, translation by the author)¹ This will lead Brubaker to the term of *groupness* that was itself used by Bourdieu some time before the works on *Ethnicity without groups*. (Cp. Bourdieu 1991 (3), 1991 (4)) *Groupness* as a tool of analysis for the scientist will help to avoid the scholastic view while aiming at a dynamic and flexible understanding of how people account themselves to a certain group, modify their understanding, experience high and low degrees of affiliation and so on which means “[...] taking as a basic analytical category not the ‘group’ as an entity but groupness as a contextually fluctuating conceptual variable.” (Brubaker 2004, p. 11) In general a review of the social practice of the actors shows that it is a significant short come if we only adopt and use the official categories that are provided by departments, politics, newspaper or scientific statements in order to describe the social reality and the societal accepted and used classifications. It is of general importance to also analyze how the people that are categorized handle and cope with the division and distinctions that are made upon them - How do the owners of a nationality play with it, adopt certain aspects, leave some characteristics of nation out or what are the daily parameters that influence the handling with that certain national category?

The connection between Bourdieu and Brubaker – The national habitus

The habitus is maybe the most influential concept of Bourdieu but at the same time also a very ambiguous one. Furthermore, it is not very clear when he established or invented the concept exactly since it was used from the very beginning of his works (cp. Bourdieu 1964, p. 102) and extended and developed during his whole works with its *theoretical climax* around his work *distinction*. (cp. Bourdieu 1984) He started out to think about his habitual concept during his works in Algeria where two worlds collided while the habitus of the pre-capitalistic peasants was confronted with the imposition of a capitalistic system. (Cp. Bourdieu 2000)²

Generally, it is not possible to find a comprehensive and last definition in one of Bourdieu’s works that states exactly what the habitus is. But there are definitions and statements about the concept that appear over the years again and again and makes it easier to grasp this central idea that goes hand in hand with his theory of the *social space* (cp. Bourdieu 1998 (1), p. 1 ff.) or *field*. (Cp. Bourdieu 1988 and Bourdieu 1980, preface) In general the habitus tries to provide an approach that unites the gap between individual and social aspects. With its specific arrangement the habitus is able to overcome this theoretical problem and stands for a place where the individual becomes social and the social becomes individual. Hence the habitus is deeply social and will be gained and formed over the time, whereas this structure is also influencing the social organizations around it in a reciprocal manner. “The habitus is not only a structuring structure, which organizes practices and the perception of practices, but also a structured structure: the principle of division into logical classes which organizes the perception of the social world is itself the product of internalization of the division into social classes.” (Bourdieu 1984, p. 170) The habitus is a system of dispositions, a definition of our taste that influences and describes physical embodiment of capital to the deeply ingrained habits and skills through which it becomes clear that a certain habitus is not only a state of the mind or a specific mindset but also a bodily condition, the way a person acts, walks, gestures and so on. The habitus, what will be later on important while connecting the concept to the research of nations and nationalism, stands for the personal and social identity of an individual (cp. Kraus and Gebauer 2002) cannot be altered or completely changed easily – the so called *hysteresis effect*. “The presence of the past in this kind of false anticipation of the future performed by the habitus is, paradoxically, most clearly seen when the sense of the probable future is belied and when

¹ [...] praktische Kategorien, situatives Handeln, kulturelle Rdensarten, kognitive Schemata, discursive Deutungsmuster, orgnaisatorische Routine, institutionelle Formen, politische Projekte und zufällige Ereignisse.

² For further readings: Kraus und Gebauer 2002

dispositions ill-adjusted .to the objective chances because of a hysteresis effect (Marx's favorite example of this was Don Quixote) are negatively sanctioned because the environment they actually encounter is too different from the one to which they are objectively adjusted.” (Bourdieu 1980 p. 62)

How can we now use the fruitful concept of habitus in order to achieve a deeper understanding of nations or nationalism? In general, the habitus can serve as the missing link between a macro-centered analysis of nationalism (cp. Hobsbawm 1990 or Gellner 1997) or a solely micro-analysis. The call from Brubaker to handle *nation* not as an analytic category but as a practical category that is used in the daily life is totally correct. ”Nation’ is a category of practice, not (in the first instance) a category of analysis. To understand nationalism, we have to understand the practical uses of the category ‘nation’ the ways it can come to structure perception, to inform thought and experience, to organize discourse and political action.” (Brubaker 1996, p. 7) If we now integrate the habitus in our analysis we will have the perfect tool to ask for this daily practice, social practice as Bourdieu would put it, in order to focus on social parameters (macro-level) and individual one (micro-level). By asking after habitual dimension while doing research about nation or nationalism this will help to overcome the outlined scholastic view from chapter one and lead us to results that are projecting and reflecting the social practice of the actors instead of justifying a stiff pattern that was created in the lonely ivory tower of the scientist.

To give an example let us refer to a basic feature of the habitus model which is called *doxa*. Hereby Bourdieu means the naturally learned, fundamental, deep-founded, quite, implicit, unconscious beliefs and values that are common to a specific player who is acting in a specific field. For example, if I don’t share the doxa of the field of football, it is simply a group of people that are eagerly running after a ball that has to be put inside a square shaped box. Only the doxa and believe in the importance of this game make the individual a real fan that is cheering for its team. “One of the most important effects of the correspondence between real divisions and practical principles of division, between social structures and mental structures, is undoubtedly the fact that primary experience of the social world is that of doxa, an adherence to relations of order which, because they structure inseparably both the real world and the thought world, are accepted as self-evident.” (Bourdieu 1984, p. 471) It makes sense that the same doxa must exist for the field of nations and nationalism. A young concept such as nations is is anything else than naturally given (cp. Anderson 1991) and it took long time to make the players believe in the importance of nations and its agencies. Hence it can be much more rewarding to ask for this certain doxa of the players instead of analyzing historic patterns of how nations became what they are now or why certain national movements were successful or not. In the same breath this would fulfill the claim from Brubaker against treating nations as single-acting entities or independent players in the field whereas it is mostly about the holders of such a nation and what they are doing with the national category, how they adopt it, play with it or refuse certain aspects of it. “It is to decouple the study of nationhood and nationness from the study of nations as substantial entities, collectivities, or communities. It is to focus on nationness as a conceptual variable, to adopt J. P. Nettl’s phrase,¹ not on nations as real collectivities.” (Brubaker 1996, p. 16)

Another example that serves as an illustration of how the habitus can help to achieve the ambitious aim of Brubaker which is not less than a change in the “[...] understanding of race and ethnicity in the social sciences” (Brubaker 2015, p. 48) is the linguistic sphere that is virulent for Bourdieu’s concept. A specific habitus is always inextricably linked to a certain way of speaking, using words, grammar and ability to understand, adopt or response within a conversation. “On the one hand, there are the socially constructed dispositions of the linguistic habitus, which imply a certain propensity to speak and to say determinate things (the expressive interest) and a certain capacity to speak, which involves both the linguistic capacity to generate an infinite number of grammatically correct discourses, and the social capacity to use this competence adequately in a determinate situation.” (Bourdieu 1991 (1), p. 37) One can go that far and say that every habitus that can be marked in the social space refers to a special language that is used within itself. Of course do French people use the same words and refer to the same base of language but it is a matter of fact that it is crucial how, when and why certain words are used or

¹ Cp. Nettl 1968

even stay unused while players are interacting. (Cp. Bourdieu 1991 (1)) On the first sight the use of the very same word might not have different meanings but the way people from different classes with different positions in the social space and therefore different habitus use this certain word can stay for a totally diverse sense or create a totally different context.

This leads to the conclusion that while researching about nations or nationalism one should focus on the language that is used within the dialogue of these phenomenon, equally on a scientific and the level of social practice. It is of utmost importance how the holders of a certain nation talk about it, which words are used, which one stay unused or are even banned and how these conversations serve as a distinctive feature within the social space. In other words and more generally spoken, can we find out about something like a *national habitus*, a habitus that is heavily influence through national features that also finds expression on a linguistic level? The language used and the words provided are anything else than a neutral or pure grammar that the users can access or not. There are severe class fights, struggles for power and distinctive acts in the fields of the social space that dominate and rule over the use of the legitimate language. (Bourdieu 1991 (1), p. 105ff.) It is crucial for a good result of any research that these mechanisms are revealed and problematized in order to understand the whole impact on the social actors and the definition of a nation itself. “[...] the social sciences must take as their object of study the social operations of naming and the rites of institution through which they are accomplished. But on a deeper level, they must examine the part played by words in the construction of social reality and the contribution which the struggle over classifications, a dimension of all class struggles, makes to the constitution of classes – classes defined in terms of age, sex or social position, but also clans, tribes, ethnic groups or nations.” (Bourdieu 1991 (1), p. 105)

Taking all this into account it becomes clear that the link between a micro- and macro-level for analyzing the phenomenon *nation* and all its connected fields of topic via the concept of habitus can lead to a fruitful and deep research that avoids the scholastic view. Hereby the result of the study will neither be too macro-focused nor will it only stay on the level of subjective believes, statements and assessments. One should not forget that the right way lies in the middle between the two opposite approaches and only in this way we can really find about the social practice that accounts for the daily life of the actors as well as macro-structures on a governmental or organizational level. With the words of Brubaker, stressing the connection between macro- and micro influences:

“[...] I want to distinguish formal and informal aspects of the politics of belonging. Certain kinds of membership— legal nationality or state membership, for example— are administered by specialized personnel using formal, codified rules. Nation membership in a more informal sense, however, is administered not by specialized personnel but by ordinary people in the course of everyday life, using tacit understandings of who belongs and who does not, of us and them. These everyday membership practices of identification and categorization, and of inclusion and exclusion, are often at variance with codified forms of official, formal membership [...]” (Brubaker 2015, p. 134). Hence, through the above mentioned tactics and research strategies the scientist will be enabled to reach for what we can describe as a description of the social practice, define national aspects of the habitus and finally achieve the “objectivity of the subjective”. (Bourdieu 2004)

Conclusion

This paper started out with referring to some of the most important theoretical aspects that can be found within the decades of work that Pierre Bourdieu conducted until the his very last days in 2002. One main topic hereby is the so called scholastic view or “why the social sciences must take themselves as their object.” (Bourdieu 2004, p. 85) This criticism refers to a point brought up by Bourdieu also during his very first works in Algeria (cp. Bourdieu 1977) stating a bias between the theoretical and cognitive patterns and thoughts that are virulent for the scientist and the daily social practice of the actors, namely the *scholastic view*. One vivid and demonstrative example for this purpose is the so called game theory that obviously relies on abstract mathematic calculative models that might help to explain some outcomes of intellectual *tragedy of the commons* but is anything else than related to a daily practice that

the players apply and rely on in their daily social life in certain fields. Avoiding these mistakes shall be one pillar a reliable, valid and objective research is relying on in order to produce results that are able to aim at an objectification of the subjective.

Another concept that is introduced by Bourdieu and can be seen as one of his main theoretical cornerstones is the model of the *habitus* that influenced the whole sociology and even found approval in non-related scientific fields. The habitus, understood as “[...] a system of durable, transposable dispositions which functions as the generative basis of structured, objectively unified practices [...]” (Bourdieu 1972, preface, VII), is very various and fruitful instrument of analysis that is able to understand and scientifically analyze all kind of social situations, patterns and, even on a micro-level, individual decisions.¹ Now, it is the deep believe of this paper that the integration of the habitus concept can show a way of how we can research about phenomenon such as nation or nationalism. Neither a pure macro-analytic approach, aiming at historical coherence and reasons, nor a simple micro-analytic approach, leaving out governmental structures or other general schemes and patterns of the whole society only focusing on subjective features of the scientific item, can give satisfying answers to the question after an explanation for how the concept of the nation could get so successful, prevail and is now, despite the opinion of some advocates of the globalization (cp. Beck 1997) that went so wrong with their assumption that the nation-states are beating retreat,² still the most powerful concept how individuals are categorized, states are organized towards each other and how a cognitive pattern for ethnicity can be characterized. Hence it is also wrong to follow the conclusion of Hobsbawm who states that the phenomenon of nation and nationalism “[...] is past its peak.” (Hobsbawm 1990, p. 192)

Following this approach, a major groundwork was done by Rogers Brubaker and his influential elaborations, stressing on the categorical aspect of alleged entities such as race, ethnicity or nations. He is providing a methodology that is trying to overcome a mainstream research of nations and the related phenomenon in order to give way for a dynamic and flexible theory that understands a category such as race, nation or ethnicity as a point of view on the world rather than a thing or a single-acting entity that has strict borders, interests and a determined process of decision making. “Ethnicity, race, and nation should be conceptualized not as substances or things or entities or organisms or collective individuals-as the imagery of discrete, concrete, tangible, bounded, and enduring ‘groups’ encourages us to do-but rather in relational, processual, dynamic, eventful, and disaggregated terms. This means thinking of ethnicity, race, and nation not in terms of substantial groups or entities but in terms of practical categories, situated actions, cultural idioms, cognitive schemas, discursive frames, organizational routines, institutional forms, political projects, and contingent events. It means thinking of ethnicization, racialization, and nationalization as political, social, cultural, and psychological processes.” (Brubaker 2004, p. 11) This is exactly where the habitus comes into play, providing the scientist with the needed tool that Brubaker was not totally aware of or hasn’t integrated so far. If we try to ask for national dimensions of a habitus or, the other way around, how the national categories do influence our habitus, we will on the one hand be able to avoid the scholastic view that denies the social practice of the actors and on the other hand integrate micro- and macro structures into our analysis. The habitus and its national peculiarities will also serve as the operationalization of what Brubaker called *groupness*³, the subjective, dynamic and flexible feeling of belonging to a certain group of people – an expression that was used by Bourdieu before. (cp. Bourdieu 1991c, 1991d) Other examples of how the theory from

¹ The habitus is not a determined concept such as the game theory where strict, mathematical calculations lead to precise outcome. Bourdieu suggests to talk about probabilities that are related to a certain habitus. For instance, the probability that a farmer with his specific habitus will visit an opera is quite low, whereas a university professor can most likely not be found in a rural pub where workers gather after the end of their work day. Anyhow, it is still possible to find the mentioned person in the specific places but then at least and again most likely their habitus is not synchronized with the social setting.

² Colorful examples among many are the BREXIT of the United Kingdom and the new policy of the President of the United States, Donald Trump, boiled down in his slogan America first!

³ “‘Groupness’ is a variable, not a constant; it cannot be presupposed. It varies not only across putative groups, but within them; it may wax and wane over time, peaking during exceptional-but unsustainable moments of collective effervescence.” (Brubaker 2004, p. 4)

Bourdieu is able to provide a powerful tool for the research of nations were given in chapter 2.2. The question after the *Doxa* (the faith in the game) a certain field such as sciences, religion or arts does provide, as it must also be provided for the believe in nations, and its assumption and the task of finding out about the linguistic dimensions and characteristics of a nationally influenced habitus, are only two aspects of the integration of habitual features into the analysis of nations and its fruitful outcome for the research results. By following the suggestions and theoretical proposal of this paper, it is the believe of the author that the theoretical horizon and methodology of nation-centered researches can be enriched significantly and that the integration of Bourdieu's heritage into contemporary theories will provide fruitful approaches that on the one hand helps to "[...] to develop fresh perspectives on the social organization and political expression of cultural difference" (Brubaker 2015, p. 1) and on the other hand result in a "[...] proposal to analyze ethnicity 'without groups,' to go 'beyond identity,' and to conceive of ethnicity as a perspective on the world, rather than a thing in the world." (Brubaker 2015, p.1).

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